

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 01334 01 OF 02 092119Z
ACTION EUR-12

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CINCUSAFE
CINCUSAREUR
CINCLANT
CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINCEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
USLOSACLANT
USNMR SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 1334

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MPOL NATO
SUBJ: THE CHALLENGE OF NATO DEFENSE: IMPROVING ALLIED RESERVE
AND MILITIA FORCES

REF: (A) USNATO 0973 (DTG 231600Z FEB 77); (B) USDEL 93/77
(DTG 161100Z FEB 77, NOTAL)

SUMMARY: WE BELIEVE THAT IMPROVEMENTS IN ALLIED RESERVE AND
MOBILIZATION FORCES OFFER THE POTENTIAL FOR HIGH RETURNS FROM
EVEN MODEST INVESTMENTS AND URGE THAT WASHINGTON GIVE STRONG
SUPPORT TO THE ONGOING SHAPE STUDY OF RESERVE AND MOBILIZATION
FORCES (REF B). FURTHER, TO PURSUE THE VICE PRESIDENT'S STATE-
MENT THAT THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENHANCE US CONTRIBUTIONS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 01334 01 OF 02 092119Z

TO NATO DEFENSE IF THE ALLIES DID LIKEWISE, WE BELIEVE THAT ONE
WAY THE US MIGHT LEAD THE ALLIES TO MEET THIS CHALLENGE WOULD
BE TO TIE INCREASED READINESS OF US REINFORCEMENT FORCES TO
RECIPROCAL, APPROPRIATE ALLIED RESERVE FORCE IMPROVEMENTS.
LINKING AN ENHANCED US CONTRIBUTION TO A COMPLEMENTARY
ALLIED RESPONSE MIGHT STIMULATE INCREASED ALLIED SUPPORT
FOR THE SHAPE STUDY AND HEIGHTEN WILLINGNESS IN CAPITALS TO
IMPLEMENT ITS RECOMMENDATIONS. IN ADDITION, WE SUGGEST
(PARA 4 BELOW) THAT, IN SEVERAL NATIONS, THE CREATION OF
SPECIALIZED UNITS WHICH COULD CAPITALIZE ON THEIR MEMBERS'

KNOWLEDGE OF LOCAL TERRAIN AND CONDITIONS (ALONG THE LINES OF THE SWISS MODEL) MIGHT MATERIALLY ADD DEPTH TO NATO'S DEFENSES AND STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE. END SUMMARY.

1. WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED (REF A) THAT IMPROVEMENT IN ALLIED RESERVE AND MILITIA FORCES WOULD FORM A NATURAL COMPLEMENT TO US EFFORTS TO INCREASE READINESS OF ITS REINFORCEMENT FORCES, AND COULD CONSTITUTE A PORTION OF THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE VICE PRESIDENT'S CHALLENGE THAT THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENHANCE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO NATO DEFENSE IF THE ALLIES DID LIKEWISE. REF B REPORTS THAT SHAPE IS INCORPORATING A STUDY OF RESERVE AND MOBILIZATION FORCES INTO ITS ONGOING STUDY ON REINFORCEMENTS, RECEPTION FACILITIES, AND ONWARD MOVEMENTS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SHAPE WILL BE LOOKING INTO THE STRUCTURE, READINESS, AND ROLES OF RESERVE AND MOBILIZATION FORCES TO INCLUDE THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE SOMETIMES COMPETING DEMANDS OF REINFORCEMENT OF ACTIVE UNITS, COMBAT LOGISTIC SUPPORT, AND REAR AREA SECURITY. WE WELCOME THIS INITIATIVE SINCE THIS WHOLE SUBJECT HAS BEEN TOO LONG INSULATED FROM COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS. FURTHER, RESERVE FORCES CONSTITUTE A LARGE POTENTIAL RESOURCE THAT, IF PROPERLY UTILIZED, COULD ADD MATERIALLY TO NATO DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE AGAINST AN INCREASED THREAT AND MIGHT PROVIDE A HEDGE AGAINST POSSIBLE MBFR REDUCTIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, WE BELIEVE THAT EVEN MODEST INVESTMENT IS LIKELY TO YIELD HIGH RETURNS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 01334 01 OF 02 092119Z

2. PLANNING A DEFENSE MADE UP OF DISPARATE NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IS COMPLICATED EVEN FURTHER BY THE FACT THAT SIZEABLE ELEMENTS OF RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS ARE NOT NATO-COMMITTED, AND THUS NATO HAS LITTLE OR NO SAY IN THEIR ORGANIZATION OR PLANS FOR THEIR USE. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL RESERVE FORCES AND PLANS ARE NOT LIKELY TO DOVETAIL WITH PLANS, CAPABILITIES, AND NEEDS OF EXTERNAL REINFORCEMENT FORCES COMING FROM THE US, CANADA AND THE UK. CONSEQUENTLY, A COHERENT, VIABLE DEFENSE MAY DEPEND ON NATIONS RISING ABOVE THE NOTION THAT REAR AREA AND TERRITORIAL DEFENSE FALL WITHIN THEIR EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE.

3. THE PROBLEM WITH EUROPEAN RESERVE FORCES STEMS FROM INADEQUATE TRAINING, EQUIPMENT, AND CONCEPTS FOR EMPLOYING AVAILABLE MANPOWER TO THE FULLEST. IT IS ABSURD TO HOLD THAT FROM THE VERY START OF HOSTILITIES EUROPE'S DEFENSE DEPENDS CRITICALLY UPON REINFORCEMENTS FROM THE UNITED STATES, WHEN REINFORCEMENTS IN THE FORM OF TRAINED EUROPEAN RESERVES, OVER A MILLION STRONG, OUGHT TO BE DEPLOYABLE ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AS ORGANIZED, TRAINED AND EQUIPPED UNITS IN SUPPORT OF THE STANDING FORCES OF NATO. OFFICIAL INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY NATIONS IN THEIR DPQ REPLIES IS SKETCHY, BUT CASTS CONSIDERABLE DOUBT ON OUR ALLIES' PREPARATIONS TO USE ALL THEIR AVAILABLE RESERVE MANPOWER EFFECTIVELY. THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLES ILLUSTRATE THE PROBLEM:

--BELGIUM. BELGIAN ARMY RESERVE STRENGTH REPORTED IN DPQ(76) IS 123,443, BUT BELGIUM CALLED UP ONLY 8,857 ARMY RESERVISTS FOR TRAINING IN 1976. FURTHER, BELGIUM'S CURRENT PLANS DECLARED TO NATO SEEM TO CALL FOR USING ONLY SOME 45,000 OF THE 123,000 AVAILABLE RESERVISTS (DRC/D(77)1, MOBILIZATION AND FORCE EXPANSION PLANS AND POTENTIAL -- SUMMARY OF MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN IN TIMES OF TENSION TO AUGMENT THE FORCES IN THE AREA OF ACE, ACLANT AND ACCHAN).

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NATO 01334 02 OF 02 092129Z
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 1334

--DENMARK. DPQ(76) SHOWS THAT DENMARK PLANS TO HAVE 130,000 ARMY RESERVISTS, OF WHOM 77,000 COULD BE RECALLED DURING THE FIRST 15 DAYS OF MOBILIZATION, TO BRING THEIR PEACETIME ACTIVE DUTY STRENGTH OF 21,450 UP TO WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH (WAS). EMBASSY COPENHAGEN HAS POINTED OUT (76 COPENHAGEN 3709) THAT MORE THAN HALF OF THE DANISH RESERVES WILL NEVER BE CALLED UP FOR ACTIVE DUTY TRAINING; THE REST WILL BE CALLED UP FOR, AT MOST, ONE WEEK'S TRAINING ONCE IN THEIR LIFE TIME. ACCORDING TO DRC/N(77)1, THE SOLE FUNCTION OF SOME 51,000 RESERVISTS IS CASUALTY REPLACEMENT OF WAR STRENGTH, A FIGURE THAT EQUATES TO A CASUALTY RATE OF SOME 50 PER CENT, A RATE THAT IS DISPROPORTIONATE TO CASUALTY RATES SUSTAINED IN PREVIOUS CONFLICTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 01334 02 OF 02 092129Z

--NORWAY. NORWAY RELIES HEAVILY ON EXTERNAL REINFORCEMENT, YET NORWEGIAN ARMY RESERVES NUMBER 122,300 THAT CAN BE RECALLED IN THE FIRST 15 DAYS OF MOBILIZATION. HOWEVER, IN 1976, NORWAY CALLED UP FOR TRAINING ONLY 19,000 OF THESE RESERVISTS.

4. IN BRIEF, THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF WORK TO BE DONE IN RATIONALIZING THE STRUCTURE AND EMPLOYMENT OF NATO'S RESERVE FORCES, AND IN IMPROVING READINESS. FURTHER, IT SEEMS OBVIOUS TO US THAT THE EUROPEANS WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE MORE POTENTIAL RESERVISTS THAN THEY CAN ACCOMMODATE WITHIN EXISTING RESERVE FORCE STRUCTURES. THE FRG, WITH ITS TERRITORIAL ARMY, IS AN EXCEPTION TO THIS GENERAL OBSERVATION. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT, IN SEVERAL NATIONS, THE CREATION OF SPECIALIZED UNITS WHICH COULD CAPITALIZE ON THEIR MEMBERS' KNOWLEDGE OF LOCAL TERRAIN AND CONDITIONS (ALONG THE LINES OF THE SWISS MODEL) MIGHT MATERIALLY ADD DEPTH TO NATO'S DEFENSES AND STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE. IN OUR VIEW, THE FOLLOWING ARE AREAS WHERE TRAINED RESERVES AND LOCAL MILITIA COULD MAKE A PARTICULAR CONTRIBUTION TO DEFENSE IN DEPTH:

A. DEFENSE OF BUILT-UP AREAS. RESERVES CAN BE EFFECTIVE IN THIS ROLE WITH LOWER LEVELS OF TRAINING AND WITH LESS SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT THAN THOSE REQUIRED FOR OPEN WARFARE ALONGSIDE REGULAR UNITS.

B. SPECIALIZED BARRIER DEFENSE FORCES. RESERVE FORCES, MOBILIZABLE IN PLACE, COULD ERECT AND MAN BARRIERS, FREEING ACTIVE FORCES FROM THESE TASKS.

C. THICKENED ANTI-ARMOR DEFENSES. RESERVES AND MILITIA FORCES, IF PROVIDED ANTI-ARMOR WEAPONS IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS, CAN ADD DEPTH AND THICKNESS TO ANTI-ARMOR DEFENSE IN THE FORWARD AREA, AT ROAD JUNCTIONS, AND ALONG ROUTES.

5. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT AT LEAST ONE OF THE ALLIES IS GIVING THOUGHT TO BETTER USE OF ITS RESERVES ALONG THE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 01334 02 OF 02 092129Z

ABOVE LINES. IN AN ADDRESS TO THE ROYAL MILITARY SCHOOL ON 17 FEBRUARY 1977, BELGIAN DEFENSE MINISTER VANDEN BOEYNANTS POINTED OUT THAT SINCE ALL OF BELGIUM'S REGULAR FORCES WOULD BE FORWARD DEPLOYED IN A CONFLICT, THE MILITARY DEFENSE OF BELGIAN TERRITORY WOULD NECESSARILY FALL PRINCIPALLY ON RESERVE FORCES. HE STRESSED THAT MOBILIZATION MUST BE WELL PLANNED AND EXECUTED RAPIDLY, AND THAT RESERVE UNITS MUST BE "FULLY OPERATIONAL." THE BELGIAN MOD SKETCHED A SYSTEM WHEREBY "PROVINCIAL REGIMENTS" MADE UP INsofar AS POSSIBLE FROM RESERVE PERSONNEL ON A REGIONAL BASIS, WOULD BE ORGANIZED ESPECIALLY FOR GUARD, SURVEILLANCE, AND INTERVENTION MISSIONS. VANDEN BOEYNANTS NOTED THAT CREATING AN EFFECTIVE FORCE WOULD REQUIRE NECESSARY FUNDING FOR PERSONNEL

EXPENSES, EQUIPMENT, AND INFRASTRUCTURE.

6. IN SUM, WE BELIEVE THAT IMPROVEMENTS IN ALLIED RESERVE AND MOBILIZATION FORCES OFFER THE POTENTIAL FOR HIGH RETURNS FROM EVEN MODEST INVESTMENTS, AND WE HAVE SUGGESTED (PARA 4 ABOVE) SOME WAYS WHEREBY THE ALLIES MIGHT MAKE BETTER USE OF MANPOWER THAT IS EXCESSIVE TO THE NEEDS OF THEIR RESERVE FORCE STRUCTURES. WE URGE THAT WASHINGTON GIVE STRONG SUPPORT TO THE SHAPE STUDY, PARTICIPATING ACTIVELY AS CONCERNS US FORCES. FURTHER, TO PURSUE THE VICE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT THAT THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENHANCE US CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO DEFENSE IF THE ALLIES DID LIKEWISE, WE BELIEVE THAT ONE WAY THE US MIGHT LEAD THE ALLIES TO MEET THIS CHALLENGE WOULD BE TO TIE INCREASED READINESS OF US REINFORCEMENT FORCES TO RECIPROCAL, APPROPRIATE ALLIED RESERVE FORCE IMPROVEMENTS. LINKING AN ENHANCED US CONTRIBUTION TO A COMPLEMENTARY ALLIED RESPONSE MIGHT STIMULATE INCREASED ALLIED SUPPORT FOR THE SHAPE STUDY AND HEIGHTEN WILLINGNESS IN CAPITALS TO IMPLEMENT ITS RECOMMENDATIONS.
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